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Abstract: The railway transport system is critical infrastructure that is exposed to numerous man-
made and natural threats, thus protecting this physical asset is imperative. Cyber security, privacy,
and dependability (SPD) are also important, as the railway operation relies on cyber-physical sys-
tems (CPS) systems. This work presents SPD-Safe—an administration framework for railway CPS,
leveraging artificial intelligence for monitoring and managing the system in real-time. The net-
work layer protections integrated provide the core security properties of confidentiality, integrity,
and authentication, along with energy-aware secure routing and authorization. The effectiveness
in mitigating attacks and the efficiency under normal operation are assessed through simulations
with the average delay in real equipment being 0.2–0.6 s. SPD metrics are incorporated together
with safety semantics for the application environment. Considering an intelligent transportation
scenario, SPD-Safe is deployed on railway critical infrastructure, safeguarding one outdoor setting
on the railway’s tracks and one in-carriage setting on a freight train that contains dangerous cargo.
As demonstrated, SPD-Safe provides higher security and scalability, while enhancing safety response
procedures. Nonetheless, emergence response operations require a seamless interoperation of the
railway system with emergency authorities’ equipment (e.g., drones). Therefore, a secure integration
with external systems is considered as future work.
Keywords: intelligent transportation; railway; CPS; security; safety; critical infrastructure
1. Introduction
Railways continue to be one of the main transport systems nowadays [1,2], covering
public, private, and military needs over a wide operational area. Thus, railway assets are
an attractive target for malicious actors and are exposed to various threats, from natural
events to man-made ones, such as terrorism or vandalism (e.g., [3–6]).
The associated risks are exacerbated by the fact that railway infrastructure assets
are typically placed along the route, including remote areas where physically protecting
them is challenging. Moreover, railway premises have a large attack surface (due to their
numerous electronic and electrical parts, such as power supply, switches, scheduling, and
other subsystems), but often reside far from the main stations. While auditing for physical
threats is quite important [7], the premises are usually inspected remotely through cameras.
Sensory equipment is also deployed to monitor environmental parameters. The goal is to
prevent potential intruders [8–10], avoid machinery overheating, and detect fires. Since the
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interconnection of this monitoring equipment is, at least partly, wireless, it can become a
target of several types of attacks.
In this context and considering that a successful attack could damage the railway’s
operation or even cause severe injuries and deaths, cybersecurity is an important considera-
tion for such interconnected critical systems [11,12]. Attackers can disrupt communications
(e.g., through jammers) or even infiltrate the networks and take control of critical equip-
ment [13]. Cyber-attacks on the command-and-control centers (C&C) and the information
systems are also feasible [13,14]. Thus, the secure interconnection of all the deployed el-
ements and platforms is important, and the cyber and physical security of the critical
infrastructure becomes imperative [9,10].
As sketched above, safety is another design factor and one that is closely related to
security. Cargo and passengers are transported in high volumes each day, covering long
distances. In the past, railway accidents have caused a number of deaths, along with
significant financial losses [15]. While the introduction of electronic controllers reduced
the occurrence of such situations [16], safety risks cannot be ignored, considering the wide
railway coverage that still includes aspects such as uninspected car-crossings, system
malfunctions (like signal loss), and, of course, the human factor [17,18].
Within the ever-changing technological landscape, there is currently a move from auto-
mated to intelligent cyber-physical systems (CPS), motivated by the speedy infiltration of the
Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud computing and enabled by wireless networking [19–22].
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [23] can cover the wide railway operational territory,
gathering and processing pieces of ambient knowledge, while gateways can be used to
transmit the data to the controlling center or a cloud service. The railway controlling
software at the backend can, then, collect and integrate the spatial information and manage
the underlying subsystems [24,25]. Therefore, WSNs are an ideal solution for covering the
railway operating area, including the railway routes and various scattered shelters.
However, the railway cyber infrastructure and networks currently only adopt rudi-
mentary defenses (e.g., cryptography), which provide protection against the most basic
threats, forfeiting effective ways of detecting advanced cyber-attacks [26]. While initially
designed as closed systems, current infrastructure networks are vulnerable to various
network layer attacks, like blackhole, badmouthing, and jamming attacks [27].
Motivated by the above, this work presents “SPD-Safe”, (security, privacy, and de-
pendability (SPD)), an administration framework for railway CPS, aiming to enhance
the security, privacy, dependability, and safety of the intelligent railway infrastructure,
while enabling services for monitoring and managing the overall setting. The framework
integrates mechanisms for mitigating cyber-attacks attempting to disrupt communications
or compromise infrastructure assets, and periodic malfunctioning of assets is also taken
into consideration. SPD-Safe can act as an intelligent communications-based train control
(CBTC) system for railway CPS, leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) to manage the system
at runtime. The system uses standardized solutions, and its building blocks can be easily
retrofitted in current deployments.
In addition to the detailed description of the proposed framework, a preliminary
implementation is described and evaluated, concentrating on the management of: (a) In-
carriage, and (b) on-route sub-systems. WSNs are deployed inside the carriage and by
the railway tracks to safeguard carriages that transfer dangerous freight and to help
avoid crashes with objects blocking the train’s route (like stuck vehicles on rail track
crossings), respectively. Furthermore, smart cameras are installed to improve the physical
security of the critical infrastructure. In the context of the two use cases (a) and (b) above,
through SPD-Safe the railway CPS is configured in real-time to tackle ongoing cyber-
attacks and control safety-related incidents. This hands-on validation was developed
and demonstrated under the EU-funded project new embedded Systems arcHItecturE
for multi-Layer Dependable solutions (nSHIELD) [28], with the cooperation of major
industrial partners in the railway and defense domains, including Ansaldo STS (http://
www.railway-technology.com/contractors/signal/ansaldo-sts/), Selex ES (now Leonardo
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S.p.A.: https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/home), and HAI (http://www.haicorp.
com/en/). Simulation analysis was also conducted during the design phase, utilizing
the security-aware Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) Simulator Framework (COSSIM) [29],
paving the way for the final installation of the proposed system, as presented in the
following sections.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, related work on railway
signaling systems is reviewed. In Section 3, the middleware platform and intelligent
agent technologies that manage the underlying equipment are presented. In Section 4,
the network layer protection mechanisms are detailed. In Section 5, the implementation
details of SPD-Safe are provided and the application in the railway setting is demonstrated.
The proposed system is also compared with relevant systems in Section 6, while Section 7
features the concluding remarks.
2. Materials and Methods—Related Work
Smart transportation ecosystems involve, among others, passenger services as well as
critical infrastructure-related applications and the associated safeguards. The fundamental
goals in this context include “green” (i.e., environment-friendly) operation, improved
performance and efficacy, as well as enhanced security and safety.
Railways, in specific, rely on signaling systems that direct the trains’ traffic. Infrastructure
control and management is achieved via various telecommunication means that are in-
stalled on carriages and tracks. Communication between track equipment and trains is
achieved via CBTC signaling systems [30–32] enabling the railway’s management and
infrastructure control. For the European Union (EU), the international wireless communi-
cations standard for railways includes the European Train Control System (ETCS) [33]. The
communication baseline is implemented by the Global System for Mobile Communications—
Railway (GSM-R) [34], which is further enhanced with the General Packet Radio Service
(GPRS) [35] and forms the base of an intelligent transportation application. ETCS utilizes
trackside equipment that transmits information regarding the route to unified controlling
equipment within the train cab. Thus, all lineside data are passed wirelessly to the driver,
without requiring the direct observation of lineside visual signals, as was the case in legacy
railway settings. The adoption of ETCS results in more and longer running trains, with
increased traffic and railway management capabilities.
In addition to the signaling developments, WSNs can now cover a wide railway
operational area, gathering ambient data. Embedded systems implement intelligence
solutions encompassing the underlying critical assets as well the interlinked smart city
ecosystems. Related frameworks for intelligent monitoring of the critical infrastructure
have already been proposed in the literature (e.g., [36,37]). The Integrated System for Trans-
port Infrastructure surveillance and Monitoring by Electromagnetic Sensing (ISTIMES)
project [36] implements a transport infrastructure surveillance and monitoring system
with electromagnetic sensing. Distributed and local sensory equipment (e.g., optic fiber
sensors, infrared thermography, low-frequency geographical techniques, etc.) are utilized
to perform non-destructive electromagnetic sensing and monitoring of the critical infras-
tructure. The Cloud to Infrared Thermography (Cloud2IR) [37] deploys an infrared and
environmental Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) information system. The software
architecture enables multi-sensor connection and the interplay with cloud computing
services (e.g., data aggregation, system management, etc.). However, the heterogeneity
of the deployed equipment and diverse demands of the various applications make the
administration of the underlying infrastructure a challenging task.
In parallel, as Service-oriented Architectures (SoAs) increase in popularity, a continu-
ous effort to deploy SoAs within the Industrial IoT (IIoT) domain and the smart railway
CPSs can be observed. Several technologies are proposed that support the required func-
tionality, ranging from agent frameworks and middleware platforms, to communication
protocols and data representation standards. Such state-of-the-art solutions are presented
in the subsections that follow.
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2.1. Management Platfroms and Reasoning Systems
Agent technologies constitute the typical option for modeling ambient intelligent sys-
tems that exchange information with the environment and user [38,39]. Intelligent agents
inspect the surrounding setting and react to upcoming events at normal operation. Their
AI modules process context-aware data, as collected from the surrounding environment by
the attached devices.
Regarding the various agent technologies, 24 frameworks were analyzed in Kravari
and Bassiliades [40], including the popular Java Agent DEvelopment framework (JADE),
Agent Globe (A-GLOBE), and Jason (the hero’s name from Greek mythology). JADE
implements the relevant standards for Semantic Web and the Foundation for Intelligent
Physical Agents (FIPA: http://www.fipa.org/) (e.g., the Agent Communication Language
(ACL) [41]). The platform is easy to learn and user-friendly, while offering portability and
compatibility with all Java Virtual Machines (JVMs). The open-source and stable developer
versions operate with several programming languages, such as Java, Jess, and Prolog. The
agent communication is fast, and the overall framework is efficient and scalable. Moreover,
JADE supports strong user authentication and cryptographic solutions—i.e., JADE security
(JADE-S)—along with Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS). The framework is
widely-used and is deployed in several fields, including reasoning in multiple domains,
general purpose applications, mobile computing, and e-commerce. The study of Kravari
and Bassiliades [40] also infers that JADE is the most popular framework due to the pure
Java design and the co-operation with several web systems. In addition, five respectable
organizations (France Telecom, Motorola, Profactor, TILAB, and Whitestein TEchnologies
AG) supervise the framework [40].
Regarding middleware systems and messaging protocols, a comparative analysis
of relevant IoT solutions (Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), Message Queuing
Telemetry Transport (MQTT), and Devices Profile for Web Services (DPWS)) was conducted
in Fysarakis et al. [42]. DPWS [43], by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured
Information Standards (OASIS: https://www.oasis-open.org/), constitutes the benchmark
in terms of ease-of-design. The framework is flexible and robust in terms of service eventing,
discovery, and subscription; following initialization, the underlying devices can discover
the provided services and communicate in a seamless manner.
Finally, concerning the deductive rule engines that enable the AI reasoning features,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) examines the capabilities of sev-
eral related approaches (Jess, Drools, Microsoft Business Rule Engine, Official Production
System Java (OPSJ), and Intelligence Logiciel (ILOG)), as described in [44,45]. Jess is ef-
ficient and excels in many categories. It works with dynamic facts and dynamism in
variables and rules and is appropriate for NASA’s mission-critical applications as well as
many other research areas [46,47].
2.2. Intelligent Railway Systems
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, only a few multi-agent systems (MAS) have
been developed and tested on actual railway environments [48,49]. In addition, despite
strong industrial involvement, not all developed agent capabilities are fully used in practice
and thus, the full potential of agent technologies is not exploited fully. Three indicative
installations on railway settings are: Train Integrity (TrainIntegrity) [50], Condition Moni-
toring of a Light Rail Vehicle and Track (CMLRVT) [51], and Sensor Networks for Railways
(SENSORAIL) [52].
TrainIntegrity utilizes WSNs to check the integrity of cargo trains [50]. The nodes con-
sist of the RCM 3400 RabbitCore module and sense environmental parameters. The WSN
raises an alarm if it infers that an unexpected change has occurred in the train’s composi-
tion. CMLRVT is built and tested on a tramway operation in Poland. The system consists
of a dispersed sensor network that is installed on the vehicles and railway infrastructure,
along with the data acquisition component and a data server that maintains the artifacts
of the management and analysis procedures. At first, the system collects data during
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normal operation, which is stored in the server. Then, the new pieces of knowledge that
are sensed by the devices are compared with the nominal values. The detected variations
are further analyzed by the system, revealing safety-related incidents (e.g., rail cracks) that
are presented to the user through a dedicated application. However, neither of the two
systems considers security issues at the network link, nor do they integrate and manage
the heterogeneous underlying embedded systems.
SENSORAIL [52] is an early warning system for the railway monitoring infrastructure.
WSNs collect and integrate data to enable the detection of structural failures and secu-
rity threats. Sensor clusters communicate information towards distant controlling centers
through GSM-R/GPRS mobile equipment. The integration of heterogeneous sensors is
managed by a component referred to as “scalable software architecture for the integration
of heterogeneous sensor systems” (SeNsIM) [53], while the detection of events is made
by a model-based data correlation component, called “novel framework for the detection
of attacks to critical infrastructure” (DETECT) [54]. SENSORAIL specifies the examined
threats in the Event Description Language (EDL) [55] and maintains them within a scenario
repository. Upcoming events are stored in a history database and model-checking is per-
formed at runtime. Regarding the middleware and agent platform, SeNsIM does not utilize
any semantic technologies and does not support related standards, thus lacking in terms of
interoperability and ease of integration with existing setups. Moreover, SENSORAIL does
not include any protection mechanisms, solely focusing on the detection of threats.
2.3. Network Layer Protection
Several schemes are suggested in the literature for protecting communication in WSNs,
attempting to address pertinent security concerns (e.g., [56–59]).
The Reputation-based Framework for Sensor Networks (RFSN) [56] authenticates
underlying nodes with the Timed Efficient Stream Less Tolerant Authentication protocol
(µTESLA) [60], implementing a beta Bayesian formulation for fading and evaluating the
reputation of the routing operation and the legitimacy of the reported sensed variables.
Ariadne [57] also utilizes a TESLA variant for authentication, collecting feedback regarding
the successful delivery of packets to choose optimum communication paths and avoid ma-
licious behavior. The Cooperative Secure routing protocol based on ARAN (CSRAN) [58]
integrates digital certificates and asymmetric cryptography for authentication. As in the
case of RFSN, it uses a Bayesian distribution for fading and, when a node detects mali-
cious activity, it automatically re-routes communication from that point on. The Secure
Resilient Reputation-based Routing (SR3) [59] adopts lightweight cryptography (LWC)
and symmetric modules for security and authentication. Fading is accomplished by a First
In, First Out (FIFO) finite list. The system combines reputation with a reinforced random
walk algorithm, producing enhanced load-balancing at the cost of a high intermediate
forwarding node count.
Despite the plethora of proposed solutions, and while most can tackle basic security at-
tacks and malfunctioning cases, there are still various open avenues for attackers, including
flooding attacks in congested periods, topology-related attacks, and jamming [61,62].
3. Administration of IoT Deployments
Considering the landscape sketched above, this section presents the proposed SPD-
Safe solution, and more specifically the deployed platform and the reasoning process of
each SPD-Safe agent. The core reasoning engine has been previously presented by the
authors in [63]. This version enhances the network layer security and is applied in a mobile
setting, forming an intelligent transportation system that complies with the real-time
requirements of CBTC for railways.
SPD-Safe comprises a framework that integrates variants of the aforementioned primi-
tives (i.e., agents, middleware, rule engine, and network layer protection) across all system
layers to implement an efficient, scalable, practical, and easy-to-deploy and maintain so-
lution, with adequate reasoning and management capabilities. From top-to-bottom, the
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system consists of four layers: (i) An overlay with intelligent agents that control distinct
subsystems; (ii) a middleware platform that enables communication between the agents
and underlying networks; (iii) the network layer that consists of interconnected IoT devices;
and (iv) the node layer that represents the devices themselves. The core technological
building blocks will be detailed in the subsections that follow.
3.1. Agent Technologies & Middleware Solutions
SPD-Safe utilizes JADE [64] as the top-layer multi-agent system. It adopts and im-
plements standardized approaches to agent deployment, such as the ACL [41] by FIPA.
The JADE-S add-on [65,66] safeguards communication at the overlay and offers built-in
security functionality for confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and authorization.
Then, each agent is ported as a bundle in the middleware platform Open Service
Gateway initiative (OSGi) [67]. Through it, an agent can monitor the underlying subsystem,
enhancing real-time management. Network gateways also deploy a controlling bundle in
the same platform, defining the offered functionality as a service in the DPWS standard [43].
The agent and the related network bundles interchange well-structured semantic data, as
defined in the OASIS standardized Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) [68]. The OSGi plat-
form also provides its own built-in security features for the inner-platform communication,
limiting bundle functionality to pre-defined capabilities and protecting both the agent and
controller bundles.
Here, other than these built-in features that are provided by the deployed platforms at
the overlay and middleware layers, SPD-Safe integrates an additional defense mechanism
for the network and node layers, namely Secure Route (SecRoute) [61], a security protocol
that protects the wireless ad hoc communication of the underlying embedded devices.
This protocol counters several types of threats and attacks at the network link, protects the
nodes’ assets and their resource consumption, and acts as an intrusion detection module
for the upper layers. When a security incident is recorded, the network gateway bundle
will send related CAP messages to the responsible agent, which may take further action.
SecRoute is detailed in the next section.
Metrics that evaluate the various system aspects are now an integral feature of the
development cycle. They offer a quantitative indication regarding the compliance with the
targeted requirements of the application domain. An evaluation method for the estimation
of the security, privacy, and dependability (SPD) properties for configurable embedded
systems is presented by the authors in Hatzivasilis et al. [63]. For every configuration
option, the metrics derive a triple vector of <Security, Privacy, Dependability>, whereby
the vector’s factors are assigned a value from 0–100, representing no to full protection
respectively. SPD-Safe adopts this methodology to enable a metric-driven SPD- and safety-
aware administration, where the reasoning procedure triggers runtime system adaptations
to reach specific SPD goals [69].
3.2. Reasoning Capabilities & Conflict Resolution
The artificial intelligence (AI) behavior of each agent is developed in the rule engine
Jess [70,71]. For knowledge representation and reasoning, the Jess-EC [72] is used. The
latter is an Event Calculus (EC) [73] implementation in Jess, offering the required semantics
modeling. SPD-Safe’s software layers are illustrated in Figure 1.
Each agents’ AI procedure implements automated temporal, casual, and epistemic rea-
soning with real-time events, action preconditions, rule priorities, indirect effects, context-
sensitive side-effects, as well as the common law of inertia. Moreover, the reasoning capabil-
ities can cope with the requirements of dynamic and partially known or uncertain domains.
However, as agents exchange information, contradictory reasoning results may occur
due to the local viewpoint of each entity and the lack of global knowledge. Thus, for
resolving conflicts, SPD-Safe introduces the epistemic mechanism of share theories [63].
The participating entities send the involved theory rules to a mediator agent, along with
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the recently sensed local events. The mediator combines these elements and performs a
reasoning operation that determines the final outcome and the state of the conflicting assets.
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Nevertheless, if an agent utilizes protected data that must be maintained locally and
not distributed ( .g., confidential information regarding user policies or system settings),
it will not be able to contribute in the share theory with its full knowledge. For this occasion,
an alternative relational grading mechanism, called certainty degree [63], resolves the affair
quickly and efficiently. The mechanism utilizes subjective criteria as well as the agents’
roles and hierarchy, marshaling the problem without constructing the related share theory
and retaining the system’s coherency. Thus, the certainty degree is applied in affairs where
reasoning with locally protected data is involved, otherwise a share theory is constructed.
3.3. SPD Measurement
The SPD multi-metric methodology [69] measures the provided protection level of a
system and its various configurations. The system’s perimeter is identified and the data
sources, entry, and exit points are recorded. Then, the mechanisms that protect each of
these elements are assessed based on the standardized Criteria Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) [69]. This involves the attack potential risk analysis that evaluates the attacker’s
motive to misuse specific system elements, expertise, and the resources that they are willing
to devote for an attack. Henceforth, five parameters are examined for the analysis of a
potential threat:
- Required time: The time that it is required to perform a specific attack (e.g., in days
or weeks);
- Expertise: The technical skills and knowledge that the attacking group can exhibit
(such as copy-cat, advanced, or expert);
- Knowledge of the target: Familiarity with the targeted system and its operation
(e.g., public, sensitive, or critical information concerning some subsystems, etc.);
- Window of opportunity: The attacker may require appreciable access to the system in
order to exploit a vulnerability and avoid detection;
- Resources: The software, hardware, or other equipment that is necessary to perform
an attack (such as specialized or common resources).
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The method does not investigate every possible attack but educes a good indication
of the defense status in accordance with standard ratings. The protection level for each
of the three SPD properties is calculated by integrating the risk analysis with the efficacy
of the installed defenses against known attacks and/or other limitations (e.g., based on
the latest reports from Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) or Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures (CVE) repositories). The result is a value in the range of 0–100,
where 0 represents the absence of defense mechanisms and 100 represents full protection.
The final outcome is a vector of <Security, Privacy, Dependability>, which represents the
total SPD value of the currently composed setting of the system. The SPDs of different
system configurations can be estimated either in advance or at runtime. The first option is
leveraged by the AI units of SPD-Safe in order to perform proactive and/or automated
changes in the state architecture when a safety or security event occurs. The second op-
tion provides indications to the human operator in order to take decisions and make
manual interventions.
Therefore, the protection status of all mechanisms and their integration in the demon-
stration examples are pre-calculated based on this method, as described in Sections 4 and 5.
Then, automated administration policies are triggered in response to real-time events, as
presented in Section 5.
These features enable the implementation of a relative novel protection strategy, called
Moving Target Defenses (MTDs) [74]. When a system is stable, it is seen as a “sitting
duck” by the attacker, who has plenty of time to analyze it, detect potential vulnerabilities,
and exploit them. With MTD, a system that is aware of the defense level of its various
components, their configurations, and the integration of all of them, can alter the setting
automatically or semi-automatically in a periodic fashion. The AI modules are always
keeping the system in a secure state, while the different configuration and architectural
sets increase the system states that have to be analyzed by the attacker. In addition, the
time that a specific setting remains active is determined by the time required for an average
hacker to analyze it (i.e., based on the “Required Time” factor of the attack potential risk
analysis). Performing attacks is becoming quite hard, while the window of opportunity for
the malicious entities has significantly decreased.
3.4. AI Processing & Performance
The reasoning component of Jess implements the RETE algorithm (Latin word for
net, meaning network in this domain) [75]. This is the most widely-used pattern matching
technique for rule-based systems and is optimized for speed. Scalability and performance
are affected by the three factors of: (i) The rules’ volume (R), (ii) the average number of
patterns in the left-hand-side of each rule (P), and (iii) the facts in the working memory
(F). Computational complexity is linear to the working memory size and in the order of
O (RPF). For each SPD agent in the railway mission-critical applications that are examined
in the following sections, the theory rules volume (R) is very low (around 30 rules per
scenario). In order to reduce the pattern-matching space, unique identifiers are assigned to
every modeled entity, and therefore, occurring events affect specifically defined parameters,
keeping the pattern-matching ration low (P) and in the order of 1–3. Performance is mostly
influenced by the number of facts (F). In the demonstrated cases, it requires 10–20 facts per
scenario. The computational overhead for an SPD agent is in the range of a nanosecond
with additionally 50 bytes in memory.
For a central agent that collects information from the whole railway system, it requires
around 500 facts and 40 rules to model the underlying setting. At boot time, the reasoning
engine takes to run around 1.6 s, 87 MB for code, and 45 MB in RAM. Then, a reason-
ing process for a theory and a few hundreds of facts would require 0.002 s on average,
representing the actual delay that affects the applications.
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3.5. Relevant Methodologies for Secure IoT Modeling
Over time, several solutions have been proposed that try to resolve the open issues of cap-
turing the security posture of an IoT or other system and facilitate its administration [76–80].
Eby et al. [76] integrated the Simple Modeling Language for Embedded Systems (SMoLES)
with the Security Model Analysis Language (SMAL) [76]. SMAL provides security ex-
tensions to the composition meta-model of the Domain Specific Modeling Language
(DSML) [77] and can express access control policies for IoT applications. The resulting
framework is called SMoLES Security (SMoLES-SEC). However, its reasoning capabilities
are bounded due to the constrained expressiveness of the underlying SMAL. Furthermore,
SMoLES-SEC cannot deduce which security characteristics hold after the compositions of
two components or the final security status of the composed system.
Service Dependency Trees (SDTs) [78] support the verification of service secure com-
position in IoT ecosystems. The IoT devices/nodes construct their own SDT. For each
provided service, the relevant SDT defines the potential external service nodes that the
service is depending on. The nodes are also aware of all recursive SDTs for their composed
services. Thus, secure service composition is performed by enabling integration only with
SDTs where all paths and involved entities are trusted. On the other hand, creating a SDT
for a real IoT application is not trivial, while trustworthiness and consistency in an actual
complex and dynamic environment may be challenging.
Albanese et al. [79] utilize attack surface metrics in order to evaluate the security
aspects of system and materialize MTDs strategies. This solution calculates the distance
of the security surface of the various system states. The goal is to administrate responses
against ongoing attacks as well as to deduce a system setting that exhibits specific de-
sirable parameters. Techniques for assessing and reducing the cost for the defender are
also included.
Savola and Sihvonen [80] propose a MTD approach based on a multi-metric-driven
management framework. The overall solution has been applied in an e-health digital
environment for chronic diseases [80], where three metric types are considered. Risk-
driven security assurance and engineering metrics are defined at deployment-time to
offer an early assessment on the deployed defense mechanisms and their effectiveness.
Continuous security monitoring metrics are determined at operational-time, enabling the
security correctness assessment, enhanced systematization, and traceability of the various
product requirements and involved metrics. Thereupon, automated adaptive decision-
making metrics are assigned at operational-time and accomplish a higher quality security
effectiveness understanding in operational security auditing and future versioning of the
system. The method supports continuous security monitoring and automated metric-driven
security-related actions.
Table 1 presents the outcomes of the qualitative analysis. The modeling expressiveness
of SPD-Safe is quite general and can also be utilized in complex and dynamic systems.
Moreover, it assesses all three security, privacy, and dependability properties and can
evaluate their status both before a composition is performed and after the integration of
the system. As with the other relevant approaches, the MTD features are driven by metrics
and SPD-Safe provides a concrete implementation of this modern defense type. The overall
solution fits with the distributed nature of IoT ecosystems and can resolve conflicts that
may arise due to knowledge sharing between the various entities.
Table 1. AI (artificial intelligence) modeling features.





generality Y N Y N N
Dynamicity Y Y Y N N
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Table 1. Cont.




Pre-composition Y Y Y N N
Post-composition Y N N N N
Evaluated Properties
Security Y Y Y Y Y
Privacy Y N N N N
Dependability Y P P N P
Artificial Intelligence
Distributed
reasoning/processing Y N Y N Y
Conflict resolution Y N N N N
MTD Y N N Y Y
Y(es), N(o), P(atrial). Service Dependency Trees (SDTs); Moving Target Defenses (MTDs); Simple Modeling Language for Embedded
Systems Security (SMoLES-SEC).
4. Network Layer Security
The protection of the network link is essential in order to safeguard the underlying
systems of critical railway infrastructure (e.g., WSN, signaling equipment, surveillance,
etc.). For this purpose, as mentioned, SecRoute [61] is developed; a novel defence primitive
that provides the core security properties for authentication, integrity, and confidentiality,
along with energy-aware secure routing and authorization.
The secure routing protocol protects the involved entities from malicious opera-
tions while improving performance and offering load-balancing. It consists of three
main primitives:
• The cryptographic service with the Timed Efficient Stream Less Tolerant Authentica-
tion protocol (µTESLA) [60], which implements message authentication, confidential-
ity, and integrity;
• The efficient secure routing service with the Self-Channel Observation Trust and
Reputation System (SCOTRES) [62] that safeguards the communication link against
ad-hoc routing attacks and network layer vulnerabilities;
• The authorization service with the Policy-Based Access Control framework (PBAC) [42],
which offers authorization and access control based on policies.
Table 2 summarizes the overall security properties that are provided by the integrated
network layer defense mechanism and the relevant threats and attacks that are countered,
while a brief analysis is presented in the subsections that follow. More details regarding the
three services are presented in the relevant papers for µTELSA [60], SCOTRES [62], and
PBAC [42], respectively.
Figure 2 presents the block diagram of the main SPD-Safe modules and their connection.
Table 2. Protection aspects of the SPD-Safe’s network layer security.
Primitive System Property Countered Threats
µTESLA
Authentication Impersonation, Sybil attacks
Integrity Data tampering,modification, interruption
Forward security Replay attacks
Confidentiality (optional) Disclosure
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Table 2. Cont.
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4.1. Cryptographic Service—µTESLAs
µTELSA is a building-block for the Sensor Protocols for Information via Negotiation
(SPIN) [81]. Loose time synchronization is required between the receiver and sender, with
µTESLA utilizing broadcast messages and symmetric cryptography to implement the
aforementioned core cryptographic properties. The security functionality of asymmetric
cryptography is achieved by utilizing keyed Message Authentication Code (MAC) opera-
tions. In brief, the sender includes a keyed MAC on every transmitted packet, where this
key is initially known only to this entity. Receivers maintain the received packets without
authenticating the sender at this point. Shortly after, the key is revealed by the sender and
then the receiver authenticates the packet and proceeds to further processing. Otherwise,
the receiver discards the unauthenticated packets after a time-slot.
The protocol µTESLA is efficient and exhibits low computational and communicational
overheads. It also tolerates packet loss and scales well for large networks. We use the Ultra-
Lightweight Cryptographic Library (ULCL) [61] in order to develop the cryptographic
functionality of µTESLA, adopting the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) with 256-bits message
digest (SHA-256) for the MAC computations and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
with 256-bits cryptographic keys (AES-256) for the encryption/decryption.
4.2. Secure Routing Service—SCOTRES
After authenticating a package with µTESLA, SCOTRES evaluates the sender’s trust-
worthiness and its contribution to the network [62]. SCOTRES is a secure routing system
for wireless ad-hoc systems that is based on trust computing and is designed around the
intricacies of CPS solutions. It maximizes the information that is inferred regarding the
network state, based on the knowledge that a node already processes. It safeguards com-
munication against Internet-originating attacks or compromised equipment and jammers.
The overall setting is utilized for real-time monitoring of IoT and CPS applications and
their management through the cloud.
SCOTRES consists of five components that rate different aspects of the networking
operation: (i) The topology-aware component improves the traffic load-balancing and
defends distant entities from being isolated; (ii) the energy-aware component estimates
the remaining energy of each node, defending the network against energy dissipation and
other relevant threats; (iii) the channel-health component identifies jamming in the wireless
medium, constraining its effects by routing communication through unaffected paths;
(iv) the reputation component ranks a node’s fair use of the network resources for routing,
forwarding, and recommending activities; and (v) finally, the trust component aggregates
all these pieces of knowledge and evaluates the trustworthiness and overall cooperativeness
of network entities. Performance and security analyses for the five components have been
conducted in [62].
4.3. Authorization Service—PBAC
After verifying the message’s legitimacy, the receiver node must decide if it will
perform the requested action or not. The PBAC framework is used to implement this
authorization functionality. The framework manages direct access to a smart device’s
resources as determined by a pre-defined collection of policies and rules that are modeled
on the OASIS standards DPWS [43] and the eXtensible Access control Markup Language
(XACML) [82]. PBAC consists of four components that are placed between the backend
infrastructure and devices: The Policy Administrator Point (PAP) and Policy Information
Point (PIP) that maintain the attribute values for creating and managing policies in a central
repository, the Policy Decision Point (PDP) that runs on a trusted gateway node with
sufficient computational capabilities, evaluates the request, and renders the authorization
decision, and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) that enforces authorization at the end
device and makes decision requests. These are combined to provide fine-grained, policy-
based access control on assets from remote endpoints (like control stations, sensors, or
cameras). Therefore, the specification of an active policy set can be used to define the
Electronics 2021, 10, 92 13 of 26
rights to access to acquired resources (e.g., sensed data and video/audio streams), the
rights to update the settings, and even the rights to push notifications of emergency alerts
(e.g., blocked routes and train crashes).
4.4. Performance Evaluation
To assess the performance and validate the feasibility of the proposed approach, Se-
cRoute is deployed on an embedded system which features BeagleBone (http://beagleboard.
org/bone) devices and is integrated with the Distance Source Routing (DSR) protocol (DSR
Uppsala University: http://dsruu.sourceforge.net/). BeagleBone is a low-cost and credit-
card-sized device with ARM architecture, executing compact Linux operating systems
(ARM Cortex-A8 processor at 720 MHz, 256 MB RAM, Ubuntu Linux). The devices sense
environmental conditions, like humidity and temperature, and exchange data wirelessly
with a central processing unit via a USB-WiFi.
We measure the processing overhead for SecRoute under normal operation without
attacks taking place. Table 3 details the resource consumption of the proposed network
layer defense. As indicated in the results, the calculation of reputation is the most compute-
intensive part, as it maintains a history with previous interactions, which also increases
the overall resource demands for trust computations. The requirements of authentication,
routing, forwarding, as well as policy check are low. For the end-to-end interaction, the
network latency is also low, ranging between 0.2–0.6 s on average. In an in-carriage setting
where the distance among the nodes is short (a few meters) the transmission overhead is
minimal, while the maximum delay is recorded for outdoor deployment where the nodes
are placed hundreds of meters away from each other. The two scenarios are detailed in the
next section.
Table 3. Resource allocation for SecRoute on BeagleBone devices.
Component ROM (KB) RAM (KB) CPU (ms)
Cryptographic service
Authentication 3.7 2.22 0.0020
Encryption 25.0 10.41 0.0028
Authenticated
encryption 28.7 12.63 0.0048
Secure routing service
Direct trust 5.6 4899.00 677.52
Reputation
evaluation 20.0 1621.00 108.97
Indirect trust
(recommendations) 30.0 185.00 37.90
Total trust 2.9 45,756.00 9.48
Accept route request 2.0 0.00 104.23
Suitable route
selection 15.0 40.00 33.17
Authorization service
PBAC policy check 24.7 36.00 7.50
Total resource consumption
Total SecRoute 210.4 46,000.00 1652.50
DSR 310.0 90,000.00 2300.00
SecRoute_DSR 520.4 136,000.00 3952.50
4.5. Comparison with Other Protocols
Efficiency and security analysis of the proposed network layer solution and five
relevant systems (RFSN, Ariadne, CSRAN, and SR3) have been presented by the authors
in [62]. Table 4 summarizes the main features of the examined secure routing protocols.
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Table 4. Secure routing protocols.
Property SecRoute RFSN Ariadne CSRAN SR3
Authentication µTESLA µTESLA TESLA Certificates LWC
Routing method DSR DSR DSR ARAN Random walk
Reputation
Fading Bayesian Bayesian NO Bayesian FIFO *
Load-balancing YES NO NO NO Partially
Energy-aware YES NO NO NO NO
Anti-jamming YES NO NO NO NO
Authorization YES NO NO NO NO
* FIFO: First In First Out finite list.
The secure network communication link of SPD-Safe is compared with the five most
relevant proposals for protecting WSNs. Simulation analysis has been performed in
the Network Simulator 2 (NS2: http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/), analyzing the perfor-
mance of each scheme and the provided protection level on a medium-size WSN with
50 nodes [62]. Four attack cases are considered for blackhole, ballot-based attacks for
link-spoofing, topology- and energy-aware attacks, and jamming. For each setting, several
experiments have been conducted, with the attackers’ participation in the network ranging
from 10–50%. Figure 3 presents the evaluation of the simulation results. SecRoute counters
the attacks and outperforms the relevant schemes, providing the highest level of security
and demonstrating the best energy- and load-balancing characteristics.
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5. SP -Safe e onstration
5.1. Railway CPS Architecture
This section details the demonstration and evaluation of the whole SPD-Safe frame-
work in the context of protecting and managing a railway CPS. In the proof-of-concept
setting, our proposal assesses and manages the system and ambient ecosystem with the goal
of safeguarding the trains’ carriages and railway’s routes. The hardware platforms incorpo-
rate embedded devices that control smart equipment (e.g., cameras and electronic doors),
inspect environmental conditions, and exchange information wirelessly. Furthermore, the
PBAC framework is applied for the control of the physical access for personnel, determined
by access rights that are specified in XACML policies. Every agent manages a smart sub-
system, like a train or a station. Backend agents can also run at the cloud in order to gather
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high level information, perform big data analysis, and enable interaction with external
systems and actuators. These agents run on virtual machines deployed on the research
cloud platform GRNET Virtual MAchines (ViMA: http://vime.grnet.gr/about/info/en/).
Figure 4 illustrates the railway system architecture. The whole setting is administered by
a master agent (MA) at the C&C. At the edge, simple and more lightweight agents (SAs)
protect the local subsystems (applying access control, lightweight data analysis, incident
detection, etc.) and exchange information with the MA (i.e., security/safety events and
response strategies). The MA can, optionally, forward data to a cloud SA for storing or
in-depth analysis. The cloud SA also presents high-level knowledge to end-users as well as
the current SPD status of the railway infrastructure.
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For this demonstration, the MA and the C&C services are deployed on a laptop. Both
MA and cloud SA are installed on machines witha 2.1 GHz Intel Core i-7 processor, 8 GB
of RAM, and the Ubuntu Linux Operating System (OS). The SAs are deployed on the
BeagleBone devices at the edge systems.
As a case study, two deployments are evaluated. In the first indoor setting, which
emulates in-carriage or shelter equipment, we test the system under normal operation and
the aforementioned attacks on routing. In the second outdoor scenario, which emulates the
on-route equipment, we examine the system’s response to safety-related incidents. Both
networks run the SecRoute protocol [61] to enable communication, protect the network
layer against cyber-attacks, and act as an intrusion detection and incident response system
for the upper layers.
5.2. Indoor Setting—Cyber-Security
The demonstration setting includes a carriage/shelter inspecting application, which
is equipped with a surveillance system and WSNs. Those components are sensitive to
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network layer threats, like jamming and blackhole attacks. The deployed network is
depicted in Figure 5, where these devices are deployed in a shelter [28]:
• At the entrance, the smart camera inspects for physical intrusion;
• Two WSNs are deployed in the shelter. WSN1-1 (green color) monitors light and temper-
ature, and WSN1-2 (red color) senses temperature. WSN1-1 and WSN1-2 utilize different
hardware to enhance diversity and ensure redundancy for the monitored factors;
• A gateway interconnects the rest of the components with the C&C.
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WSN1-1 consists of eight Memsic Iris sensor nodes (16 MHz Atmel ATMega 1281
processor, 8 KB RAM, Contiki OS). The devices are battery powered and measure light and
temperature. Furthermore, the smart camera is controlled by the node at the carriage’s
entrance. WSN1-2 is installed for redundancy and is comprised of Zolertia Z1 sensor nodes
(16 MHz MSP430 processor, 8 KB RAM, and Contiki OS) that collect temperature data. The
two WSNs are monitored by two relevant simple agents (SA1-1 and SA1-2 respectively).
Every device executes the PEP module of the PBAC framework. The devices also exchange
data with the gateway, which runs the access policies for PBAC, and communicates with
an MA which administrates the whole network.
The devices gather environmental information and send data to the relevant base
station (laptop with WiFi connectivity). This component integrates and processes the
received information. It also runs an application with which the user accesses and manages
the overall testbed.
The different components are evaluated by the corresponding agents, who also esti-
mate the aggregate SPD value of the whole system. The agents inspect their underlying
domain, managing it based on an SPD-aware reasoning operation. Furthermore, the sys-
tem is re-configurable at runtime according to the SPD protection and performance goals
defined in the activated policy. Affected agents configure their subsystem’s settings to raise
the SPD value when attacks are performed and then return to normal when the attacks
are over (to save resources). Regarding the adaptation capabilities integrated within the
proof-of-concept, the cryptographic service provides three communication states: Plain-
text, authenticated, as well as authenticated encryption. Additionally, the trust scheme
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supports two trust evaluation states: Direct trust only, as well as a combination of direct
and indirect trust.
The system begins with a moderate SPD configuration to conserve resources
(i.e., authenticated communication and direct trust). If SPD-Safe observes malicious activity,
it informs the system entities to raise their protection level. The relevant response actions
are specified in a security policy (applicable to the specific device type), such as applying
authenticated and encrypted communication with combined direct and indirect trust
information. The SPD value and status of each system component is then altered as a
response to the launched attacks, so as to achieve a sufficient level of protection. The WSNs
comply with the current policies, becoming stricter to misbehavior and isolating the
compromised nodes. The main protection mechanism against cyber-attacks (i.e., blackhole
or link-spoofing) is provided by SecRoute, while the smart camera enhances physical
protection. In the same way, the system returns to the previous (initial) state when the
triggering conditions are over.
For WSN1-1, we emulate scenarios where: (i) A node is malfunctioning due to low
battery, and (ii) a compromised node launches a badmouth attack. In (i) the node is
protected when a low energy level is observed by not including in traffic forwarding
operations. The administrator gets notified accordingly. When the issue is fixed, the trust
level is restored and the nodes’ operational status returns back to normal. In case (ii),
the compromised entity is detected when the attack rate reaches a threshold and it is
blocked from routing operations. For WSN1-2, we launch blackhole and jamming attacks
against congested or topology significant components. The secure routing mechanism
successfully identifies both attacks and mitigates them. Table 5 presents in detail the
above-mentioned scenario phases. The SPD levels are depicted with: (i) Red for values of
0–50—i.e., a situation where the provided protection is low, the proper functionality may
not be available, and the operator must take immediately the related countermeasures;
(ii) yellow for values of 51–70—i.e., moderate protection but still safe operation; and
(iii) green for values of 71–100—i.e., high levels of protection.
Table 5. Scenario steps of the smart transportation use case.
Event Description SPD State Total <S, P, D> Value SPD Visualization
1 Start of all components andservices.Discovery/registration operations. Initial State <80, 70, 65>
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5.3. Outd or Setting—Safety Scenario
For outd or on-route defense, a similar WSN with four BeagleBone nodes is installed.
The nodes are connected with a mains power supply and control a smart camera as we l
as weather sensors. In the emulated use-case, the nodes and related SAs are deployed on:
(i) The pa senger’s station; (ii) the track; (iii) the carriage departure, and; (iv) a l bridges
and tunnels along the track. Figure 6 illustrates the on-route WSN2 [28] along with the
central MA and underlying SA2-1–SA2-4.
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Through the responsible SA, the networking components (e.g., sensors and cameras)
send real-time information to a security control center and the related master agent. Figure 7
depicts the graphical user interface and the visualization of the information that is collected
by the on-route equipment, as developed by Ansaldo STS.
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I c f a e er e c , the agents anage the syste co pone ts to advise the
r assist the pas engers. de str t i ci t e l t s the response
t f fire-alar , ere decisi s co cer i t safet a sec rit st be
taken. In Appendix A, the code sample Figure A1 describes the CAP message that indicates
the fire alarm.
Normally, for the indoor setting, the personnel and passengers are allowed to open
doors based on their access rights (as determined by safety and security rules). When
fire is detected by the sensors, an alarm is triggered, and the associated agent is notified.
The agent takes the decision to degrade the security status by unlocking all doors, there-
fore enabling the unhindered evacuation of the train. Furthermore, via GSM, the agent
automatically transmits an SMS to the responsible authorities concerning this incident
(including situation’s severity, GPS coordinates) and alerts the neighboring entities to be
aware (e.g., agents on nearby trains). The train agents that cross the area are also notified
to perform related actions (such as stop to the nearest station or change route). Moreover,
it is assumed that during normal operation the smart cameras capture frames at a low rate
to preserve bandwidth. When the alarm is raised, the setting is reconfigured at runtime,
offering a high framerate and continuous monitoring of the affected area. As the fire is
extinguished and the damaged components are restored, the normal status is restored.
The code shown in Figure A2 summarizes the main processing flow and the emergency
response rules that perform the described actions (for more information regarding EC,
please refer to Mueller [73]).
6. Discussion
6.1. Comparison
This subsection compares SPD-Safe with the related works presented in Section 2.2
(i.e., TrainIntegrity, CMLRVT, and SENSORAIL) in terms of features. Table 6 summarizes
the comparison results.
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Table 6. Smart railway systems.
Property SDP-Safe TrainIntegrity CMLRVT SENSORAIL
AI technologies JADE/Jess NO NO SeNsIM
Reasoning & processing Distributed Centralized Centralized Centralized
Conflict resolution YES NO NO NO
Security management YES NO NO NO
Safety management YES YES YES YES
Middleware OSGi NO NO NO
Network layer
protection SecRoute NO NO NO
Cloud management ViMA NO NO NO
All the related smart railway systems identified adopt semantic representation and
reasoning. The service-oriented approaches conform to the specific application aspects and,
therefore, in all relevant systems the agents are uniquely responsible for specific operations.
The conflicting patterns are also not examined in most of these designs, limiting their
applicability to specific deployments.
Furthermore, the three related systems do not use any management middleware for
embedded devices. This approach is quite limiting in the IoT era, where high volumes
of heterogeneous equipment have to be deployed and co-function. The systems also
neglect the popular agent frameworks which, among others, provide efficient agent-related
functionality and implement relevant standards. The reasoning operation is developed
with general purpose programming languages, ignoring the advantages offered by the
deductive rule-based techniques. Mechanisms for resolving conflicts, when implemented,
are based either on epistemic or relational reasoning. More importantly, these related
systems do not safeguard security, privacy, and dependability, and do not utilize any
built-in protection technologies.
Conversely, SPD-Safe is a solution focusing on the SPD management of IoT and CPS
settings. The SPD modeling is based on well-structured metrics that analyze the various
configuration options of a multi-layered system. The AI process adjusts the railway CPS
and counters attacks at runtime. SPD-Safe integrates state-of-the-art technological building
blocks and platforms for the implementation of reasoning, as well as the management
of devices and agents. Epistemic and relational reasoning are incorporated for resolving
conflicts. Furthermore, the proposed framework adopts standardized technologies, from
semantic standards to communication protocols and authorization schemes.
6.2. Future Work
SPD-Safe integrates several technologies in a secure manner. It preserves the SPD
properties, enables active defenses and countermeasures, and can facilitate emergency
response operations.
Active and offensive types of defenses are proposing nowadays, as the next step
to enhance protection and mitigate threats, that the mainstream passive mechanisms
(e.g., cryptography, network slicing, anti-viruses, etc.) cannot tackle. MTD is such an
approach. It is becoming harder to analyze the system and exploit its vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, in conjunction with other intrusion detection techniques, it can mitigate or
even block some type of ongoing attacks. Nevertheless, more research is needed in order
to make guidelines for the implementation of effective MTD policies as well as strategies to
mitigate more advance attacks.
Moreover, safety-related events require the participation of relevant authorities. In
modern settings, emergency authorities possess their own equipment, which is utilized dur-
ing safety incidents. The cooperation of the involved systems becomes vital when it comes
to rescuing lives. For the effectiveness of the response services, the systems must authenti-
cate and authorize the various participants and exchange information (e.g., sensors’ data,
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surveillance video, etc.) in real time. The seamless interoperation will be examined in
future extensions of SPD-Safe.
7. Conclusions
This paper introduced SPD-Safe, an administration framework for IoT settings in
ambient secure and safety-critical domains, applied to protect a railway CPS. For secure
connectivity, an innovative secure routing protocol was integrated in the network layer. The
protocol covers all core security properties (confidentiality, integrity, and authentication)
and features policy-based authorization. It was found to be energy efficient and could
effectively counter a variety of attacks, providing defense against several threats that are
not mitigated by existing solutions. For smart monitoring and automatic adaptation, smart
agents were deployed at the edge systems and backend infrastructure, and performed the
required AI processes. A multi-agent system was developed in the JADE platform and
integrated on the OSGi middleware for the management of DPWS-enabled equipment,
also utilizing various built-in protection mechanisms. The core reasoning process was
implemented in Event Calculus. The SPD validation and metric-driven administration
were modeled as a heuristic framework in a security-related theory. The implementation
of MTDs was enabled, providing extra protection against attacks that were not mitigated
by passive defenses. Furthermore, the system models a safety-related theory and imple-
mented associated AI ambient strategies and plans. The two features were incorporated
to administrate the underlying components, considering both the SPD and safety aspects.
To validate the proposed approach, SPD-Safe was deployed to administrate WSNs on a
complex railway CPS testbed, where the underlying components were successfully config-
ured at runtime and mitigate security-related attacks, while AI reactive plans preserved
the safety of personnel and passengers in emergency situations. The average delay in real
equipment was around 0.2–0.6 s.
In terms of future work, advances in MTD solutions and integration with emergency
response services were considered. MTDs are coming to the foreground nowadays and are
expected to play a significant role in future defense strategies as AI becomes an integral
part of new generation systems. Safety critical systems, such as the railway ones, must
provide an adequate means to collaborate with emergency authorities and support their
operations. Facilitating emergency response and a rapid restoration of service must also be
considered by modern smart railway installations.
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Appendix A
The code sample Figure A1 describes the CAP message that indicates the fire alarm.
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